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Conclusion
In the near future Oklahoma courts will be faced with the issue of whether
a landlord may permissibly bar children, or families with children, from apart-
ment housing. It will be up to the courts to examine recent decisions in other
jurisdictions dealing with such issues, and to evaluate Oklahoma's public ac-
commodation statute in light of that important issue.
The courts must first determine that an apartment project is a "place of
public accommodation" within the meaning of the statute. In light of the
liberal language of the statute and the broad legislative intent, it would be
appropriate for the courts to reach such a conclusion. The next step will be
to determine if children are a protected class within the statute. Again, the
broad legislative intent, along with the absurd results that would follow if
the statute were interpreted otherwise, warrant the conclusion that the statute
was meant to bar all arbitrary discrimination. The courts should also be in-
fluenced by the recent California Supreme Court decision that held that a
landlord may not bar children from an apartment project under a statute very
similar to Oklahoma's.
Sandy Schovanec
Negligence: Bradford Securities Processing Service v.
Plaza Bank & Trust. Expansion of Attorneys'
Professional Negligence Liability to Third Parties in
Oklahoma
In the past, for tort liability to arise out of a contract, the courts required
privity between the parties.I The privity requirement was based on the premise
that since the obligation arose solely out of the contractual relationship, any
liability for a breach of the obligation should be limited to the contracting
parties. This policy encouraged the formation of contracts by providing limits
to a party's liability. Thus an attorney was liable for negligence only to his
client with whom privity existed.2 In some jurisdictions the privity require-
ment has been eroded,3 but until recently only one court had completely
disregarded the privity requirement in legal malpractice actions.4
In a recent Oklahoma case, Bradford Securities Processing Service v. Plaza
1. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex 1842).
2. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
3. Lucas v. Harem, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 987 (1962); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958); O'Toole v. Franklin,
279 Or. 513, 569 P.2d 561 (1977).
4. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 987 (1962).
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Bank & Trust,I the Oklahoma Supreme Court abandoned the privity require-
ment in attorney negligence cases. By so doing, the court has extended the
potential liability of an attorney in Oklahoma beyond that of an attorney
in any other state. This note will take a historical look at the law in Oklahoma,
compare the Oklahoma approach to that of other jurisdictions, and predict
the likely impact of the decision upon attorneys in Oklahoma.
The Oklahoma Law Before Bradford Securities
Historically, the courts have held that for tort liability to arise out of a
contract there must be privity between the parties.' In Savings Bank v. Ward,'
the United States Supreme Court held that the obligation of an attorney is
to his client and not to a third party.8
In Ward an attorney was retained by the purported owner of a tract of
land to examine and issue a title opinion as to the purported owner's title
to the tract. The attorney certified that the purported owner's title was good
and unencumbered, when in fact the latter had already conveyed the tract
in fee by a duly recorded conveyance. A third party, with whom the attorney
had no contract or communication, loaned money to the purported owner
based upon the title opinion. The loan was secured by a deed of trust to the
property. The purported owner later defaulted on the loan and was insolvent.
Had the attorney exercised a reasonable amount of care, he would have
discovered the prior conveyance by his employer. The third party sued the
attorney, asserting that privity of contract is not necessary to enable recovery
for an attorney's negligence.9 The Supreme Court held that privity was a prere-
quisite to any recovery, and absent privity an attorney cannot be held liable
to a third party for any negligence or want of reasonable care, skill, or
diligence.'I
The Supreme Court admitted certain situations constitute exceptions to the
general rule of no liability to a third party. Where fraud and collusion are
alleged and proved, a lawyer will be liable to those injured even absent privity."
A lawyer will also be liable to a party not in privity where the act is one
imminently dangerous to the lives of others, or is an act performed in pur-
suance of some legal duty.'2 This liability arises not out of contract but out
of the duty imposed by law to avoid acts that are imminently dangerous to
human life.'
3
In Ward the Supreme Court felt compelled to limit liability for negligence
in performance of a contractual duty to the parties to the contract:
5. 653 P.2d 188 (Okla. 1982).
6. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex 1842).
7. 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
8. Id. at 200.
9. Id. at 196.
10. Id. at 200.
11. Id. at 203.
12. Id. at 206.
13. See Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N.Y. 351, 358 (1870).
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Such a restriction on the right to sue for a want of care in the
exercise of employments or the transaction of business is plainly
necessary to restrain the remedy from being pushed to an imprac-
ticable extreme. There would be no bounds to actions and litigious
intricacies if the ill effects of the negligence of men may be followed
down the chain of results to the final effect.'
4
In effect, the Supreme Court advocates contracts as desirable relationships
that should not be unduly burdened by imposing liability for injury to third
parties on the parties to the contracts. As burdens on these relationships become
greater, parties will become more reluctant to enter into future contracts. In-
deed, if a duty is imposed on an attorney to persons outside the contract
who are not intended to benefit from the contract,'5 the attorney could be
liable for every consequence of an action to every person affected, and the
cost of practicing law would be prohibitively expensive."
The question of attorney liability to a third party has had little treatment
in Oklahoma since three early cases established the rule in this state.7 The
facts in each case were similar, with each involving an attorney representing
his client in a legal action and each being sued by a third party for his ac-
tions. In the latest of the three cases, Thomas Fruit Co. v. Levergood,I the
court summarized its position in all three cases: "[Tihe public interest demands
that the general rule be established and remain that attorneys at law, in the
exercise of their proper functions as such, are not liable for their acts when
performed in good faith for the purpose of protecting the interest of their
clients."' 9 The underlying reasoning seems to be that if an attorney cannot
advise and act solely in his client's best interests without fear of harassment
by a third party, parties could not obtain their legal rights.20 Although the
fact situations in the early cases were quite different from that of Bradford
Securities, the law established then should still apply. Whether an attorney
is drafting a legal document or making an appearance in court for his client,
he must be able to act solely in his client's best interest. Public policy should
not support protection of a third party from monetary loss because of his
reliance on an opinion not intended for his use.
A more recent federal court case, Franke v. Midwestern Oklahoma Develop-
ment Authority,2' held that as a matter of law in Oklahoma an attorney could
not be held liable to a third party for negligence while representing his client,
14. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 202 (1879).
15. Reasons for allowing recovery by third party beneficiaries are discussed in the text ac-
companying notes 76-80, infra.
16. Comment, Attorney Malpractice-A "Greenian " Analysis, 57 NEY. L. REv. 1003, 1009
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
17. Thomas Fruit Co. v. Levergood, 135 Okla. 105, 274 P. 471 (1929); Waugh v. Dibbens,
61 Okla. 221, 160 P. 589 (1916); Anderson v. Canaday, 37 Okla. 171, 131 P. 697 (1913).
18. 135 Okla. 105, 274 P. 471 (1929).
19. Id.
20. Waugh v. Dibbens, 61 Okla. 221, 224, 160 P. 589, 592 (1916).
21. 428 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
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unless the attorney was in privity with that third party.2" In Franke the facts
were similar to those in Bradford Securities. The defendants were employed
by the Midwestern Oklahoma Development Authority to serve as bond counsel
and issue an opinion to the effect that the issuer was legally organized in
the state of Oklahoma; that the bonds were lawfully authorized and were
valid and binding obligations of the issuer; that payment of the bonds was
secured by a first lien on, and a pledge and assignment of, specified collateral
and revenue; and that interest on the bonds was tax-exempt.2 3 The plaintiff
invested in the bonds, which proved to be worth less than face value. Plain-
tiff invested based on information given him, which allegedly omitted certain
key information as to the risks and value of the investment. Plaintiff brought
suit alleging violations of rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act, common
law fraud, negligence, and violation of the Oklahoma Securities Act. The court
granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that negligence would
not lie absent privity of contract and that the requirements for statutory liability
were not met."
In Franke the court cited Ultramares Corp. v. Touche5 as authority for
nonliability to a third party for negligent performance of the contract. In
Ultramares, the defendants, a firm of public accountants, were employed to
prepare and certify a balance sheet exhibiting the condition of a client's
business. The defendants were aware that the company borrowed large sums
of money to finance its operations and that in the usual course of business
the balance sheet when certified would be shown to creditors as the basis of
financial dealings. Defendants certified several copies of the balance sheet,
one of which was shown to the plaintiff, who lent money to the company
in reliance thereupon.26 The court found that although the audit had been
negligently made, the defendant did not owe the third party plaintiff a duty
to make the audit without negligence."7
In his opinion in Ultramares, Justice Cardozo feared that if liability for
negligence did exist, a thoughtless slip or blunder might expose a party "to
a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an in-
determinate class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are
so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implica-
tion of a duty that exposes to these consequences."2 Ultramares does admit
that there can be liability to a third party if that party is the intended beneficiary
of the contract. Rather than label the case of a third party beneficiary as
an exception to the general rule, the opinion characterizes the bond between
parties to a contract and a third party beneficiary as so close as to approach
that of privity, if it is not privity itself.29 Because Franke was decided in federal
22. Id. at 726.
23. Id. at 724.
24. Id. at 726.
25. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
26. Id. at 175, 174 N.E. at 442.
27. Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 446.
1983]
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court and is not binding as precedent in Oklahoma, it is not an accurate state-
ment of attorney liability to a third party in this state. It is useful, however,
to show how attorney liability to third parties might have been handled in
this state.
In a more recent case, Keel v. Titan Construction Corp. ,30 a homeowner
brought suit against a contractor and an architect hired by the contractor,
alleging improper design of a solar heat system the contractor had agreed
to construct for the homeowner. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that
the homeowner stated a cause of action as a third party beneficiary to the
contract between the contractor and the architect.3 ' By statute, "a contract,
made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him
at any time before the parties thereto rescind it." 3 A third party beneficiary
of a contract may thus sue for a wrong based upon negligent breach of con-
tract. The court continued, and considered, having established that the duty
of the architect to exercise ordinary professional skill and diligence is implied
in the contract, whether the duty extended to the homeowner so that the archi-
tect would be liable if negligent to the homeowner.3 The court held that this
stated a cause of action based on tort and therefore the question of privity
did not apply. 4 The court relied on Lisle v. Anderson ,3 in which the court
held that whenever circumstances in a situation would cause a reasonably pru-
dent man to reasonably apprehend that, as the natural and probable conse-
quences of his act, another person might be in danger of receiving an injury,
there arises a duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent that injury.
Although the court's holding may be acceptable where physical injury may
result, it seems unacceptable where the only injury is monetary. Under the
test applied in Keel, if a grocer, for example, might reasonably foresee that
by lowering his prices he would drive his competitor to bankruptcy, he would
be under a duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent that injury. While public
policy would favor protection against physical injury, it certainly cannot sup-
port the destruction of the free enterprise system. The court must have con-
fused duty with foreseeability. Once a duty is owed, then the foreseeability
of harm should be considered. Public policy, for example, would impose a
duty not to physically harm others. Once this duty is imposed, the foreseeability
of harm to the plaintiff would be considered in light of the reasonable man
standard.
The court in Keel held that whether the injury resulting from the defend-
ant's negligence could have reasonably been foreseen was a jury question.6
As long as the action is brought in tort and not on the contract, privity should
not be an issue, although both tort and breach of contract actions could well
30. 639 P.2d 1228 (Okla. 1982).
31. Id. at 1231.
32. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 29 (1981).
33. Keel v. Titan Constr. Corp., 639 P.2d 1228, 1232 (Okla. 1982).
34. Id.
35. 61 Okla. 68, 159 P. 278 (1916).
36. Keel v. Titan Constr. Corp., 639 P.2d 1228, 1232 (Okla. 1982).
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arise out of the same act. In Keel the architect's negligent design of the solar
heat system was a breach of the contract with the builder. The homeowner,
who was intended to be benefited by the performance of the contract, also
had an action available based on contract against the architect. Another possi-
ble basis for recovery existed in tort. "Accompanying every contract is a com-
mon law duty to perform it with care, skill, reasonable experience and
faithfulness."" If this duty is breached, the question is one of proximate cause.
This doctrine is used to limit the tortfeasor's liability for his acts to that which
is reasonable and just.38
Keel expanded liability to third parties in Oklahoma by ruling that the mere
fact that a duty arose solely out of a contract was an insufficient basis on
which to limit tort liability to parties to the contract. The case left doubts
as to whether the court intended to limit liability for negligence arising from
a contract to parties to the contract and others intended to be primarily
benefited thereby, or whether the liability would extend beyond third party
beneficiaries to anyone to whom harm could have reasonably been foreseen.
It does appear that the court was not trying to overexpand tort liability and
probably intended that some relationship existed between the parties of a suit,
either as mutual parties to a contract or with the plaintiff being a third party
beneficiary to the contract.
The Bradford Securities Holding
In Bradford Securities Processing Service v. Plaza Bank & Trust, 39 Fred
Rausch, the defendant attorney, acted as bond counsel for the issuance of
Osage Authority Industrial Revenue Bonds, issued by a public trust created
under the laws of Oklahoma. In his opinion defendant made representations
as to the payment of consideration, legality of the bond issue, and the tax-
exempt status of the bonds.
Plaintiff was in the business of "clearing" securities transactions on behalf
of its customers. Pursuant to this business, plaintiff advanced money to Tower
Brokerage and National Municipals, customers of the plaintiff. This advance
was secured by $2,075,000 worth of Osage Authority Industrial Revenue Bonds
received by plaintiff on behalf of its customers. Plaintiff retained possession
of the bonds and became a pledgee.
On or after March 27, 1974, both Tower Brokerage and National Municipals
defaulted in repayment. Plaintiff subsequently foreclosed and became a forced
purchaser of the revenue bonds. The bonds proved to be of little or no value.
Plaintiff brought suit in federal court alleging violation of certain provi-
sions of the Securities Exchange Act by all defendants except defendant Rdusch.
Plaintiff based its claim against the bond counsel on negligence, under
Oklahoma law, for representing in his bond opinion "either expressly or by
37. Id. The opinion also cites New Trends, Inc. v. Stafford-Lowdon Co., 537 S.W.2d 778
(Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
38. Keel v. Titan Constr. Corp., 639 P.2d 1228, 1232 (Okla. 1982).
39. 653 P.2d 188 (Okla. 1982).
1983]
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necessary implication from the language used that the entire consideration
for the bond issue had been paid, that the said bonds were legally issued,
and that the interest . . . would be excludable from gross income under Sec-
tion 103 of the Internal Revenue Code."1
40
Plaintiff's complaint against Rausch was dismissed for failure to state a
claim on which relief could be granted. This was apparently on the belief
that Keel limited recovery to those who were either a party to the contract
or were intended to be benefited by the contract. An appeal followed, and
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certified the following question
to the Oklahoma Supreme Court:
Does a pledgee who forecloses on bonds state a cause of action
against bond counsel for alleged negligence in preparing his opinion
which made representations, inter alia, of payment of considera-
tion, legality of the bond issue, and tax-exempt status of the bonds,
where counsel allegedly knew that his legal opinion would appear
on the bond certificates and be relied on by the purchasers of the
bonds and where the opinion was also relied on by the pledgee?,"
Bradford Securities provided an opportunity for the court to set guidelines
as to the extension of liability in tort arising out of a contract. Instead of
clarifying the scope of its expansion of liability as expressed in Keel, the court
chose to allow the jury to determine attorney negligence by use of the follow-
ing test: "[I]s the conduct of an ordinarily prudent man based upon the dangers
he should reasonably foresee TO THE PLAINTIFF OR ONE IN HIS POSI-
TION in view of all the circumstances of the case such as to bring the plain-
tiff within the orbit of defendant's liability?"'" The court also held that it
was not the particular injury to the plaintiff that was important, but the
likelihood of some such harm, and if the defendant did not exercise the care
of an ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances, he should be liable
to the plaintiff for injuries suffered as a result of that negligence.'3 Thus,
the pledgee had stated a cause of action.
In Bradford Securities the court relied heavily upon its findings in Keel.
It relied upon four principles of law enunciated in that case to reach its
decision:
(1) whether the defendant's negligent breach of contract brings the plain-
tiff within the scope of the defendant's liability is a proximate cause issue;
(2) an injury must have been reasonably foreseeable to a tortfeasor before
liability exists;
(3) where under the circumstances an ordinarily prudent man could
reasonably foresee that, as the natural and probable consequence of his act,
another person is in danger of becoming injured, a duty to exercise ordinary
care to prevent such injury arises; and
40. Id. at 190.
41. Id. at 189.
42. Id. at 191.
43. Id.
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(4) it is a jury question of fact as to whether the injurious consequences
resulting from the negligence could have been reasonably foreseen.
Only where one reasonable conclusion can be drawn from the facts does
foreseeability become a question of law for the court."
The court distinguished Keel from the case at bar only on the basis that
in Keel only one plaintiff was trying to be brought within the scope of the
defendant's liability, whereas in Bradford Securities the class of potential plain-
tiffs was a potentially large class of persons.45 The court apparently found
no distinction on the basis that Keel involved a party intended to be benefited
by the actions, whereas Bradford Securities involved a potential plaintiff not
primarily intended to benefit from the contractual relationship. Had the court
drawn this distinction, it could have maintained the privity requirement and
limited liability to parties to the contract and others intended to be benefited
thereby. Instead, the distinction drawn by the court allowed a broadening
of the scope of liability in Oklahoma.
At least some consideration was given by the court to Justice Cardozo's
concern in Ultramares" about extending "a liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."' 47 The court
refused to apply the law set out in Ultramares because it limited liability to
those in contractual privity with the defendant and privity is not applicable
to tort law in Oklahoma. The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that although
the fears expressed by Justice Cardozo might provide a basis for an argument
as to whether the harm to the plaintiff was foreseeable to the defendant, the
argument could only be considered as it relates to proximate cause.48 Thus,
the fear of extending liability to this extent is not a consideration in determin-
ing whether a duty is owed to a party because the court held that once a
duty is assumed by contract, that duty is extended to anyone to whom harm
might be foreseeable. The jury makes the determination as to whether the
harm was foreseeable based upon the circumstances of the case. Thus, it seems
that any distinction is gone as to the rights of a third party beneficiary and
a third party relying on an opinion, except to the extent that a jury chooses
to consider the point in view of the circumstances of the case. Using this
standard a jury is free to find that an attorney is liable to a third party who
was never intended to benefit from the attorney's work product. In the pre-
sent case, a jury may decide that in light of all the circumstances, the at-
torney should reasonably have foreseen the dangers to the pledgee such that
the attorney should be liable for the damages resulting to the pledgee as a
result of his negligent opinion.
Analysis
The implication of the Bradford Securities decision is that an attorney may
44. Id. at 190.
45. Id.
46. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
47. Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
48. 653 P.2d 188, 191 (Okla. 1982).
19831
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now be liable for his negligence in performing a contract to third parties
regardless of whether the third parties were intended to benefit from perfor-
mance of the contract. This extension of liability seems to be a more liberal
approach than any similar extension in other jurisdictions. Just as in
Oklahoma, other courts have historically maintained that in order for there
to be general tort liability there must also be privity. 9 The requirement,
established in Savings Bank v. Ward,"° has been consistently followed, and
most courts still require privity in legal malpractice actions."
The privity requirement was first abandoned in products liability cases in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co." Permitting recovery by a consumer for
an injury caused by a defective product against the manufacturer was based
partially on the theory that the person most likely to be injured by the pro-
duct is the ultimate consumer, not the retailer, and the consumer is the least
able to protect against the injury."
Only six years after privity was first abandoned in MacPherson, the New
York Court of Appeals allowed recovery to a third party outside of the pro-
ducts liability area. In Glanzer v. Shepard,54 the defendant, a public weigher,
was hired by a merchant to weigh 905 bags of beans he sold to the plaintiff.
The defendant weighed the beans and certified the weight, and the plaintiff
relied upon the certification when he purchased the beans. When the actual
weight turned out to be less than the amount certified, the purchaser sued
the defendant for the amount of overpayment. Justice Cardozo imposed a
duty on the defendant that would extend to all who relied upon his certifica-
tions, not just those in privity with him."
When viewed with Justice Cardozo's subsequent opinion in Ultramares Corp.
v. Touche," one might reasonably infer that Justice Cardozo was willing to
extend liability to protect only those that must necessarily rely upon the opinion
and who are in fact intended to benefit from the opinion that is the product
of the contract. This is a more workable approach than that of Bradford
Securities because it minimizes the outside burdens placed on contracting par-
ties, while still protecting those third parties that should be protected. It is
clear that Cardozo used the primary intent of the contracting parties to limit
liability to third parties.1
7
One factor possibly used as a basis for limiting the scope of the defend-
ant's liability was consideration of public policy. 8 The court recognized that
49. Note, Guy v. Liederbach: Expanding the Attorney's Duties Beyond the Limits of the
Privity Requirement, 11 CAP. U.L. REv. 643 (1982).
50. 100 U.S. 195 (1879). See supra text accompanying notes 9-15.
51. Comment, supra note 16, at 1009.
52. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
53. Id. at 391, 111 N.E. at 1053.
54. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
55. Id.
56. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). See supra text accompanying notes 25-29.
57. Id. at 183, 174 N.E. at 446.
58. See discussion in Comment, supra note 16, at 1011 n.46.
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it should not impose a duty that would place too substantial a burden upon
the parties to a contract.
An example of public policy consideration is found in Biakanja v. Irving."
In that case, a notary public agreed to prepare a valid will for the testator.
The will proved to be invalid because the defendant negligently failed to have
the will properly attested. This negligence resulted in harm to the plaintiff,
the sole beneficiary under the will, who received only a one-eighth interest
by intestate succession. The court held that the case-by-case determination
of liability to a third party not in privity is a matter of public policy.0 The
determination was based upon a balancing of various factors, including
the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plain-
tiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that
the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between
the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame
attached to the defendant's conduct and the policy of preventing
future harm."
The importance of Biakanja is not simply that it extended liability of a
negligent party beyond parties in privity to the contract. It clearly defined
the factors to be used in determining whether the defendant is liable."2 Brad-
ford Securities does not provide similar guidelines for a jury to consider.
The California Supreme Court reaffirmed its intentions in Lucas v. Hamm63
by holding that an attorney may be held liable to beneficiaries under a will
for negligence in drafting the instrument, despite the fact that no privity ex-
ists. Because the defendant was an attorney, the court added one factor to
those set forth in Biakanja.6" The court considered whether the recognition
of liability to beneficiaries under negligently drafted wills would impose an
undue burden on the profession.
6
.
The balancing test as expressed in both Biakanja and Lucas allows for a
meaningful basis upon which to evaluate all the circumstances in determining
liability to third parties. A jury can determine liability based upon considera-
tion of all the factors, whereas the Oklahoma decision considers only one
factor: the foreseeability of harm. Consideration of the other factors allows
for a more equitable result. It is unclear as to whether Bradford Securities
will evolve into a balancing test through judicial interpretation of the phrase,
"in view of all the circumstances of the case,"' 66 although such an interpreta-
tion would be a desirable modification. It is not suggested that abandonment
59. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
60. Id., 320 P.2d at 19.
61. Id.
62. Comment, supra note 16, at 1012. See also Note, Torts: Liability for Negligent Perfor-
mance of a Contract to Persons Not in Privity, II OKLA. L. RPv. 473 (1958).
63. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1963).
64. See supra text accompanying note 61.
65. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 589, 364 P.2d 685, 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824 (1961).
66. Bradford Securities Processing Serv. v. Plaza Bank & Trust, 653 P.2d 188, 191 (Okla. 1982).
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of the privity requirement is undesirable. The expansion of liability beyond
the parameters of Ultramares67 is, however, questioned.
Alternative Approaches
The Oklahoma Supreme Court had four options available for dealing with
attorney liability to third parties. It could:
(1) maintain the privity requirement stated in Franke;"
(2) allow recovery by parties to a contract and third parties that were in-
tended beneficiaries to the contract;69
(3) require a balancing of factors test such as the Biakanja-Lucas test; or
(4) extend liability by requiring conduct of a reasonably prudent man based
upon the dangers he should reasonably foresee to the plaintiff or one in his
position in view of all the circumstances of the case.
In the discussion following, each option will be examined in light of various
third party situations. Third parties bringing malpractice suits generally fall
into three categories: persons who suffer loss because of the lawyer's role
as advocate for his client; persons whom the client intends the lawyer's work
to benefit; and persons who rely on opinions the lawyer prepares for the
client."0
Third Party Suits Arising From the Lawyer's Role as an Advocate
Where an attorney is acting as an advocate, he has a duty "to represent
his client zealously within the bounds of the law. . . ."" "Neither his per-
sonal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons
should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client." 2 To permit liability
to a third party to a contract would frustrate the ethical policy behind the
duty of zeal owed to a client.73 Thus, special considerations must be taken
into account where the attorney is in an adversarial situation. If a duty to
a third party is imposed upon the attorney, his effectiveness to his client may
be compromised.
Where the privity requirement is maintained, no question of liability arises
in the adversarial situation. Likewise, if persons intended to benefit under
67. In Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 189, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (1931), the court held
that the decision does not relieve a defendant if his act
has been so negligent as to justify a finding that they had no genuine belief in
its adequacy, for this again is fraud. It does no more than say that, if less than
this is proved, if there has been neither reckless misstatement nor insincere profes-
sion of an opinion, but only honest blunder, the ensuing liability for negligence
is one that is bounded by the contract, and is to be enforced between the parties
by whom the contract has been made.
68. Franke v. Midwestern Oklahoma Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
69. For a general discussion, see 7a C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 142 (1980).
70. Comment: Liability of Lawyers to Third Parties for Professional Negligence in Oregon,
60 OR. L. REv. 375, 383 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Liability].
71. MODEL CODE OF PRo--ssIoNAL REspONsmmnIY EC 7-1 (1977).
72. Id. EC 5-1.
73. See Comment, Liability, supra note 70, at 383 n.50.
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the contract are allowed recovery for negligence, no conflict of interest arises
because the aim of the contract involves furthering the interests of the
beneficiary.
Applying a balancing of factors test, the extent the contract was intended
to benefit the plaintiff and the burden that a contrary result would place on
the legal profession should outweigh all other considerations. As a result, no
liability should be found in an adversarial situation.
Applying the Oklahoma test, it seems that a reasonably prudent man under
the circumstances would recognize his duty to his client to be paramount,
but with foreseeability as the sole test of liability, a duty would be recognized
to third parties even when inconsistent with the duty owed the client.74 An
attorney might have a duty to a doctor, based on foreseeability of the loss
of reputation to the physician from filing of a medical malpractice suit based
on inadequate investigation by the plaintiff's attorney." This interest is in
direct conflict with the attorney's duty to his client and should not be recog-
nized in such a case. It seems that under the Oklahoma test set out in Brad-
ford Securities, if the attorney falls to exercise the care that an ordinarily
prudent man should have exercised under the circumstances, he will be liable.
Whether the court will rationalize this situation and find a reasonably pru-
dent person would balance the alternatives, or whether a reasonably prudent
person would ignore the possible harm to the doctor to protect the lawyer-
client relationship, is unclear.
Third-Party Intended Beneficiaries
If a beneficiary under a will is disallowed his inheritance because of negligent
drafting of the instrument, a clearly inequitable result will occur if no recovery
is permitted. Application of the strict privity requirement would not serve
the interests of the client, the beneficiary, or the legal profession. The client,
who paid the attorney to draft a valid will to effect his wishes, has not received
his bargain. He is dead, so he cannot bring an action or correct the situation.
The beneficiary, although clearly intended to receive under the will, gets nothing
and is denied recovery from the guilty party. There would be little or no sanc-
tion against the attorney and thus no incentive to avoid the mistake in the
future.76 Indeed, maintenance of the privity requirement in attorney malprac-
tice cases indicates a bias toward the legal profession that has an adverse im-
pact on public opinion about the profession."
Using any of the remaining approaches: allowing recovery to third party
beneficiaries, balancing the factors under the Biakanja-Lucas test, or apply-
ing the Oklahoma test, a third party intended to be a beneficiary should be
allowed to recover for attorney negligence. Because the lawyer's first duty
is to use due care in carrying out his client's intentions," failure to carry
74. Id. at 396.
75. Id. at 392.
76. Comment, supra note 16, at 1014.
77. Id. See discussion at 1014 n.63.
78. Comment, Liability, supra note 70, at 385.
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out that duty should result in attorney liability. This is entirely consistent with
a lawyer's ethical duties." Further, it seems appropriate to place the cost of
the attorney's error on the party best prepared to absorb it-the attorney,
who can protect himself by purchasing malpractice insurance.10 He can then
pass this cost along to his clients.
Third Parties Who Rely on Opinions Prepared for the Client
In a case like Bradford Securities where a third party relies upon an opinion
prepared for a client, it is much more difficult to determine the most equitable
allocation of liability. If a strict privity requirement is imposed, the attorney
cannot be held liable to a third party. If third party beneficiaries are also
allowed to recover, the question of liability will turn upon whether an intent
primarily to benefit the third party can be found."
Under the facts of Bradford Securities,"2 it is doubtful that a court would
find that a pledgee loaning money on the basis of an attorney's opinion was
intended to be a primary beneficiary. At best, it might be argued that the
opinion was prepared primarily for the benefit of the original purchasers of
the bonds who would rely upon the attorney's opinion in deciding to invest
in the bonds. Any subsequent purchasers of the bonds were not intended
beneficiaries because the attorney's original client, the issuer of the bonds,
has no interest in whether bonds are subsequently sold on the open market
by the original purchasers. The primary interest of the bond issuer was rais-
ing capital. Once this was done by the original issuance, further dealings in
the bonds are of secondary interest to him. Limiting liability to third party
beneficiaries would preclude recovery in a situation similar to the one in Brad-
ford Securities.
Application of the Biakanja-Lucas balancing factors test might allow a dif-
ferent result. The court would consider first the extent to which the parties
intended that the transaction benefit the plaintiff. Under a Bradford Securities
situation very little intent to benefit would be inferred, as benefit to the plaintiff
was of little concern to the attorney or his client, the public trust. Second,
the court would consider the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff. Third,
the court would take into account the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
would suffer injury. Next, the closeness of the connection between the defend-
ant's conduct and the injury suffered would be examined. Here, a forced pur-
chaser is a second generation purchaser of the bonds. The court should consider
this in light of Justice Cardozo's fear that the assumption of one relation
will mean the involuntary assumption of a chain of new relations.8 3 Moral
79. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
80. Comment, supra note 16, at 1014.
81. Although most Oklahoma cases require a contract be made expressly for the benefit of
the third party, it is clear that incidental benefit to a third party is insufficient. It must appear
that the parties intended to recognize the party as the primary beneficiary. Apex Siding & Roof-
ing Co. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 301 P.2d 352 (Okla. 1956).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 39-43.
83. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 189, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (1931).
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blame attached is probably not a major consideration under these facts,
although the policy of preventing future harm could well be important. The
final consideration-whether extending liability will be an undue burden on
the profession-should not be too important here. The attorney who acts as
a reasonable attorney will not be held liable. The negligent attorney will still
be able to protect himself by purchasing malpractice insurance, although
premiums may be higher.
The net result of this balancing of factors would permit the court to reach
an equitable result under the facts of the case by weighing the appropriate
factors. The factors provide sufficient guidelines while allowing more freedom
than provided under the Oklahoma test. One problem with the balancing of
factors test is that there is no way to predict how the various factors will
be weighted, so it is difficult to determine potential liability in advance.
Application of the Oklahoma standard at first glance seems to preclude
the equitable considerations allowed under the Biakanja-Lucas test. If it ap-
pears that an ordinarily prudent man would have foreseen the harm to the
plaintiff or one in his position, and if the defendant fails to exercise the care
an ordinarily prudent man should have exercised, the defendant will be liable
to the injured party. Thus, if a reasonably prudent man would have foreseen
injury to the forced purchaser if he failed to meet the standard of care of
a reasonably competent attorney, then the attorney would be liable if his acts
were negligent:" Upon closer examination, it seems that the court may per-
mit a balancing of factors in determining whether the harm was foreseeable
to the plaintiff. The court indicates that the apprehensions expressed by Justice
Cardozo in Ultramares" may be a telling argument as to whether the harm
was indeed foreseeable.8 6 Thus, although at least theoretically the holding in
Bradford Securities seems to expand liability to third parties farther than other
states, in practice the standard may work much like the Biakanja-Lucas balanc-
ing of factors test.
Conclusion
In Bradford Securities the Oklahoma Supreme Court has expanded the
liability of an attorney in Oklahoma for negligent performance of his con-
tractual obligations. Although it is desirable to extend liability from the former
privity limitation, the court's holding may have expanded liability too far,
rendering an attorney liable to anyone relying upon his work product under
the contract.
The court has imposed a duty on an attorney to anyone to whom harm
is reasonably foreseeable. This duty places an undue burden on the contrac-
tual relationship between an attorney and his client and could result in serious
conflicts between interests of the client and of third parties. Judicial inter-
84. Bradford Securities Processing Serv. v. Plaza Bank & Trust, 653 P.2d 188, 191 (Okla. 1982).
85. See supra text accompanying note 28.
86. Bradford Securities Processing Serv. v. Plaza Bank & Trust, 653 P.2d 188, 191 (Okla. 1982).
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